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TOWARD CHANGING MODELS OF SECURITIES
ARBITRATION*
Edward Brunett
INTRODUCTION
The 1987 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon'
decision unleashed a remarkable growth in the arbitration of
securities disputes between customers and brokers.2 Ten years
later, what should we make of the explosive growth of securi-
ties arbitration? To be sure, many, including Judge Bruce
Selya, laud the growth of securities arbitration and arbitration
in general. Nonetheless, commentators have criticized the
present state of securities arbitration and called for reform.'
Indeed, the call for serious reform of the securities arbitration
process has reached a serious enough level that the NASD has
©1996 Edward Brunet. All Rights Reserved.
'Henry J. Casey Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark College, Northwestern
School of Law. LL.M., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Illinois; BA,
Northwestern University. Professor Brunet serves as an arbitrator for the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD") and the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA").
1 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
" In 1995, 6055 new arbitration claims were filed with the NASD. See NASD,
THE NEUTRAL CORNER 7 (1996).
' See, e.g., William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration:
A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NoVA L. REV. 1223 (1993); David A. Lipton,
Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEc. REG. LJ. 26
(1991) [hereinafter Generating Precedent] (criticizing lack of precedent in securities
arbitration); David A. Lipton, Mandatory Securities Industry Arbitration: The Prob-
lems and the Solution, 48 MD. L. REV. 881 (1989) [hereinafter Mandatory Arbi-
tration] (criticizing the limited ability to appeal arbitral awards and the limited
document discovery methods); Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbi-
tration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV. 327, 349-55 (1996) (criti-
cizing lack of adequate discovery in securities arbitration); Lynn Katzler, Comment,
Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in all Securities Arbitrations?:
The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
151 (1995) (criticizing lack of written opinions in securities arbitration and recom-
mending a change to a system mandating opinions with supporting reasons); Mar-
garet Jacobs, NASD Panel to Study Reforms in Arbitration Process, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 1994, at C1.
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responded with voluntary changes, and the NASD Task Force
Report4 has urged that numerous steps be taken to improve
what is widely perceived to be a NASD securities arbitration
system in need of repair.
Judge Selya has decried the present state of reforms as
effectively ruining securities arbitration by overly judicializing
what he perceives as a necessarily simple arbitration model.5
To hear Judge Selya's comments is to learn of a successful,
healthy arbitration system that needs improvements, but only
at the margins. Judge Selya strongly criticizes the existing
trend toward judicialization of securities arbitration. In a nut-
shell, Judge Selya criticizes numerous Task Force proposals,
including (a) increased use of discovery in securities arbitra-
tion; (b) the early appointment of arbitrators to regulate dis-
covery; (c) the writing of opinions when awarding punitive
damages; and (d) the initiation of early neutral evaluation'
and mediation programs as alternatives to securities arbitra-
tion.7 He laments that litigation and securities arbitration
have effectively collapsed and become mirror images of one
another.
To say that I take issue with most of these points is an
understatement. The Task Force recommendations are a step
in the right direction that, in my judgment, could have gone
even further. In contrast, the simple model of arbitration
championed by Judge Selya is no longer demanded by many
parties knowledgeable and experienced in arbitration and the
choice of arbitral processes.
The trend toward judicialization of securities arbitration
should be recognized as part of an overall market shift in arbi-
tration models toward increasing demand for customized arbi-
tration clauses. Part I of this Article describes this significant
I NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RE-
FORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (1996) (hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT]; see infra text accompanying notes 105-124.
" Bruce Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1433 (1996).
6 Early neutral evaluation ("ENE") involves an appointed "neutral" who is
assigned to evaluate a case, inform the parties of the probable result and facilitate
a potential settlement of the dispute. See David I. Levine, Northern District of
California Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 JU-
DICATURE 235 (1989).
Selya, supra note 5, at 1451-53.
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'change in arbitration models away from the folklore type of
arbitration championed by Judge Selya and toward use of a
"contract model" that often results in so-called judicialized
arbitration. In fact, securities arbitration's abandonment of
folklore arbitration is in tune with a shift toward a more com-
plex arbitration model dominated by party intent and market
forces. Part II directly addresses the argument that securities
arbitration has effectively become litigation and concludes that
securities arbitration is sufficiently differentiated from conven-
tional litigation. Part III analyzes the policies advanced by the
increasing judicialization of securities arbitration and con-
cludes that this shift in models is a positive development.
I. SHIFTING ARBITRATION MODELS: FROM THE FOLKLORE
MODEL TO THE CONTRACT MODEL
Perhaps the most difficult concept to understand about
arbitration is its flexibility and creativity. Arbitrations lack a
rigid, fixed model with one firm set of characteristics. Rather,
there are many types of arbitration and each has special quali-
ties. Reform of securities arbitration requires a sensitivity to-
wards the following range of distinct arbitration models that
presently exist.
A. Multiple Models of Arbitration
1. Folklore Arbitration
Folklore arbitration represents the most common denomi-
nator of the differing arbitration models. Judge Selya's image
of arbitration probably falls within folklore arbitration. It is
characterized by speedy, informal hearings and the following:
(1) no evidence rules; (2) no discovery; (3) awards of an equita-
ble nature that frequently ignore prevailing law; (4) no written
opinion; (5) private hearings; and (6) "final" results with no
right to appeal to the courts. For many, these traits are those
that typically come to mind when attempting a settled defini-
tion of arbitration. In fact, however, arbitration of this type is
increasingly less common; the disputants have demanded vari-
ous changes in an overly simplistic and sometimes flawed
model under attack as inadequate for administering complex
1996] 1461
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disputes.8 I have labeled this type of arbitration "folklore arbi-
tration" because these characteristics are probably what most
arbitration outsiders think of when the word arbitration is
used. In the common folklore, these traits aptly describe arbi-
tration. In the debates about arbitration, folklore arbitration
has taken on almost a mythic nature. Some mistakenly as-
sume that all arbitration is folklore arbitration.
2. Judicialized Arbitration
Numerous types of arbitration now employ procedures
which resemble those of litigation. It is not uncommon to see
arbitration that includes: (1) motion practice; (2) application of
substantive law; (3) awards that include findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and reasons; (4) substantial discovery; and (5) a
degree of judicial review provided either by creation of an arbi-
tral review panel or by an arbitration clause that calls for
review of "errors of law." These features, of course, resemble
conventional litigation.
Judicialized arbitration, however, falls short of a typical
lawsuit in numerous ways by retaining an identity distinct
from conventional litigation. First and certainly foremost, judi-
cialized arbitration lacks a jury. The avoidance of a jury trial is
one of the true characteristics of all arbitration. Parties who
knowledgeably consent to arbitrate seek to opt out of decision-
making by a jury. They often fear that the jury will interject a
fact based sense of arbitrariness into their decisionmaking that
will produce an unfair and potentially prejudicial result. Sec-
ond, the arbitral hearing is likely to be informal, with little in
the way of formal application of the rules of evidence. Even
judicialized arbitration hearings do not resemble a trial be-
cause the rules of evidence do not exist in this context. Third,
the hearing and the final result are likely to be private and not
' See, e.g., Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications, Inc., 64
F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995) (two large corporations contract to arbitrate but provide
that errors of law shall be subject to appeal); Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992) (corporation and securities firm con-
tract for arbitrator to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law); Fils et Cables
d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (corpo-
rate parties to international business transaction agree to arbitrate and direct
arbitrator to make findings of fact and base award on such findings).
1462 [Vol. 62:1459
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open to public scrutiny or criticism. These traits are the rea-
sons that the parties have not chosen conventional litigation
but, instead, selected a form of arbitration much different than
folklore arbitration.
Particular attention should be given to the potentially high
costs ofjudicialized arbitration. The trial-like characteristics of
this more formal type of arbitration mean that those parties
who select judicialized arbitration must be willing to spend
more to achieve the particular advantages they seek. Judicial-
ized arbitrations also are less timely than folklore arbitrations.
The additional length of time taken to achieve the various
judicial safeguards will be a factor in driving up costs. The fact
that judicialized arbitration exists demonstrates that some
firms are willing to pay more for what they perceive to be a
higher quality of arbitration. The age-old adage that "you get
what you pay for" applies in dispute resolution where some
parties are very willing to spend more. Those parties who seek
this judicialized form of arbitration desire accurate, informed
results that are more in line with substantive law but still do
not want a jury or the public scrutiny associated with trial.
3. Contract Model of Arbitration
Because consent to arbitrate is an essential element of
arbitration, it may seem unusual and confusing to speak of a
contract model of arbitration. Arbitration is the creature of
contract. Nonetheless, recent Supreme Court cases and market
demand illustrate the primacy of the contract model of arbitra-
tion in which arbitration takes on dispute resolution features
selected by the contractual partners.9 Judicialized arbitration
is a reflection of the ascendancy of the contract model of arbi-
tration. Some disputants will contract for arbitration that re-
sembles litigation and select some of the features of the ordi-
nary trial process. Others may prefer a low cost, "stripped-
down" form of dispute resolution with no discovery whatsoever
and an informal hearing. If folklore arbitration is something
' See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. CL 1920 (1995);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. CL 1212 (1995); Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989).
19961 1463
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the contract parties want, there should be a legal means to
supply for this market demand. Courts will typically uphold
the will of the contract signatories and enforce their choice of a
potential menu of procedural options. To the extent that arbi-
tration exists, it is a reflection of contract and the meaningful,
informed consent of the parties. Accordingly, it should not be
surprising that the courts have looked to the desires of disput-
ing contractual partners in allowing the increasingly custom-
ized arbitrations that exemplify the contract model of arbitra-
tion.
4. Public Interest Model of Arbitration
An additional type of arbitration has been described by
Professor Speidel as a public interest model of arbitration."
This variety of arbitration is regulatory in nature, with an
administrative agency regulating its process. Securities arbi-
tration is one example of public interest arbitration. Telecom-
munications arbitration is a second example.11 While securi-
ties arbitrations are sponsored by the self-regulatory organiza-
tions ("SROs"), the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has statutory authorization to oversee and regulate the
SROs.
The public interest model of arbitration is necessitated by
market failure. Because arbitration is the creature of contract,
government regulation will not typically need to be available in
the arbitral process. Market theory holds that only where some
substantial market failure exists should the government inter-
vene. The degree of existing securities arbitration oversight by
the SEC is due to the perception that the SROs need some
public interest scrutiny in their own necessarily self-interested
oversight of the self-regulatory process. Some oversight of the
SROs by a public body fosters investor confidence.
10 Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Con-
sent?, 62 BRoOK. L. REV. 1335, 1362-63 (1996) (calling for a "public" model of
securities arbitration).
"' See § 252 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 10 Stat.
66 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp. 1997)) (calling for arbitration of
disputes between companies that control local service and newer competitors who
seek to use the network of the incumbent firm).
1464 [Vol. 62:1459
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The SEC has statutory authority to influence securities
arbitration. In the 1975 amendment to section 19 of the Ex-
change Act, the SEC was given the power to oversee proposed
SRO changes in arbitration rules; proposed changes must be
consistent with the Exchange Act to merit approval.'2 In addi-
tion, the SEC can "abrogate, add to, and delete from" any SRO
rule in order to advance the investor protection policies of the
Exchange Act.'3 This guarantee of regulatory power was one
of the factors that led the McMahon majority to its pro-arbitra-
tion holding.'
The past and present degree of SEC public interest regula-
tion of securities arbitration reveals an ongoing agency pres-
ence but little in the way of regulatory vigor. The quantum of
securities arbitration regulation that exists stems from the
changes made by the SROs that are often instigated by the
Securities Industries Conference on Arbitration ("SICA").'5
The SEC had a direct role in the initiation of securities arbi-
tration when, in 1976, it solicited public comment regarding
the evaluation of a "uniform system of dispute grievance proce-
dures for the adjudication of small claims.""6 Input from the
public indirectly led the SEC to issue a report recommending
new dispute resolution procedures involving broker-investor
disputes. z7 Following McMahon, the SEC led a number of ini-
tiatives to improve the quality of arbitration in a new era in-
volving a higher volume of more complex, multi-claim securi-
ties arbitrations. The director of the SEC Division of Market
Regulation sent a thirteen-page letter to the SROs and SICA
listing a wide variety of recommended changes to the code of
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1975).
1 Id. § 78s(c).
14 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987).
"The SICA was created in 1977 to study securities arbitration. It consists of
representatives of the SROs, the Securities Industry Association, an industry trade
association, and the public. The SICA makes periodic reports to the SEC. See
generally Constantine N. Katsoris, SICkA The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 483 (1996). The SICA was created to develop a uniform code of arbi-
tration. See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 419 (1989).
" Settling Disputes Between Customer and Registered Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,528, 9 SEC Docket 833, 834 (1976).
1 An Integrated Nationwide System for the Resolution of Investor Disputes,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,974 [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,807 (Nov. 15, 1976).
1996] 1465
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arbitration; these changes were subsequently approved by
the SEC in 1989.18 In 1993, the SEC approved changes in the
Code of Arbitration which required arbitrators to describe the
issues in controversy, the amounts claimed and the amount
awarded. 9
While the theory of SEC oversight of SRO activities ap-
pears plausible, the reality is a system that leaves any public
interest regulation of securities arbitration largely in the
hands of the SROs. The amount of SEC resources devoted to
overseeing securities arbitration appears minimal.0 The occa-
sional comments or suggestions regarding securities arbitra-
tion by the agency do not represent much in the nature of true
public interest regulation. The thorough study of securities
arbitration done by the NASD Task Force is the type of work
one might have expected from an agency devoted to regulating
securities arbitration. Regulation of the SROs was, however,
intentionally designed as a modest form of regulation.21
Accordingly, securities arbitration, while a variety of pub-
lic interest arbitration, is far from the heavy-handed form of
regulation that one associates with a regulated industry. The
SEC oversight of the SROs appears to be a fairly weak form of
public interest arbitration and one that relies on elements of
judicialized arbitration to achieve the degree of self-regulation
necessary to instill investor confidence."
," See Lipton, Generating Precedent, supra note 3, at 29. SICA responded to
these recommendations by changing the Uniform Arbitration Code, and the SEC
later approved these rule changes in 1989. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., NASD,
and the American Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to the Arbitration Process and
the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 26,805 11989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %I 84,414 (May 10, 1989). These changes
improved document discovery, made available the prehearing conference and rede-
fined the distinctions between public and private arbitrators.
19 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1166 (Aug. 1993).
20 Margaret Jacobs, SEC Faces Criticism for Role in the Oversight of Arbitra-
tion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995, at C1.
2 Accord, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 265
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Commission does not pretend that its over-
sight consists of anything other than a general review of SRO rules and the abili-
ty to require that an SRO adopt or delete a particular rule."); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 643 (3d ed. 1995)
("[Riegulation of the ethics of an industry means a substantial degree of self-regu-
lation, properly supervised by government.").
' See infra text accompanying notes 89-101.
1466 [Vol. 62: 1459
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Telecommunications arbitration is another example of
public interest arbitration. Section 252 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 calls for arbitration of the inevitable disputes
between incumbent telephone companies that control local
service and newer competitors who now may enter the market
by using, for a fee, the network of the incumbent firm.' Un-
der the Act, the parties to these interconnection disputes may
seek arbitration from the state utility commissions. Such dis-
putes are likely to be complicated and involve powerful parties
and complex ratemaking issues within the special expertise of
the state utility commissions. The use of arbitration to set
compensation fees should keep such complicated matters from
taking the time of the court system and take advantage of the
subject matter expertise of the state regulatory agencies. The
legislation is silent on the arbitration procedures that the state
agencies will utilize. Presumably, states will make their own
administrative rules governing the arbitration of interconnec-
tion disputes. State utility commissions will review the arbitra-
tion decisions to determine if the results are consistent with
the legal standards of the Telecommunications Act."4 The Act
also permits an aggrieved party to sue in federal court to de-
cide if the results of the arbitration and the state commission
review are consistent with the Act. This procedure will put fed-
eral district judges in the unusual position of reviewing an
arbitration for legal error; they will not be reviewing the pri-
vate decisions of a contract arbitration.'
' Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 252, 10 Stat. 66
(1996).
24 I& § 252(e)(6).
' This procedure is unlikely to be looked upon favorably by the already busy
federal trial judges. Years ago the Supreme Court effectively washed its hands of
vigorous judicial review of complicated ratemaking orders of administrative agen-
cies. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944).
19961
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B. Debunking Folklore Arbitration as the Unitary Arbitration
Paradigm: Revisiting the Ambiguous History of the Federal
Arbitration Act
Many commentators, including Judge Selya, treat arbitra-
tion as though it is a constant, fixed process with a definite
meaning. They point to arbitration as a consensual process
with an expert arbitrator, little or no discovery, application of
equitable principles, informal and speedy hearings, and results
that are final. To be sure, these characteristics of the "folklore
arbitration" still paint a fairly accurate picture of arbitration in
general and securities arbitration in particular. Nonetheless,
the arbitration paradigm set forth by these characteristics is
presently crumbling. The NASD's adoption of some litigation
procedures and the recommendations of the Task Force report
illustrate that arbitration is not based upon a fixed, rigid set of
characteristics.
One cannot fully comprehend the recent changes to judi-
cialize arbitration without careful consideration of American
arbitration history. The passage of the United States Arbitra-
tion Act in 1925 did not, in fact, at all mark the adoption of a
firm, definite arbitration paradigm. Many ambiguities existed
in the type of arbitration envisioned by the drafters of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In fact, the following discus-
sion demonstrates that the seeds of judicialized and contract
models of arbitration are present in the legislative history of
the FAA.
The primary goal of the 1925 FAA was to reject the doc-
trine of ouster and permit federal courts to compel and enforce
agreements to arbitrate." Under the notion of ouster, Ameri-
can courts refused to honor pre-dispute arbitration agreements
that "ousted" the judiciary's jurisdiction to hear a civil dis-
26 See Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Promises for Arbitration of
Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions of Commerce Among the
States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings] (testimony of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman
of Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of New York, that proposed
new legislation "would make arbitration a reality . . . would cause an agreement
or contract in writing providing for arbitration to be binding upon the parties and
an irrevocable proposition").
[Vol. 62: 1459
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pute" Pre-FAA custom permitted the revocation of predis-
pute arbitration agreements.2 The FAA was designed to
abandon unequivocally the ouster and revocation reasoning
and, instead, to effectuate the agreement of contractual parties
to engage in a binding arbitral process.' The contract model
was central to the basic concept underlying the passage of the
FAA.
These goals were aimed solely at the federal courts. Ac-
cording to Professor Ian Macneil's exhaustive study of the
FAA's background," there is no support for any intent for the
1925 federal legislation to be applied by the state courts.
The chief sponsor of the bill, Julius Henry Cohen, made re-
peated references to the federal courts in his testimony and
disclaimed any intent to "bludgeon" the legislation upon an
unwilling state.32 Despite this clear intent, the Supreme
Court has confused the FAA's purpose by mistakenly holding
that the intent of the Act was to force the states to apply the
various principles embodied in the federal law.'
It is also clear that the FAA was intended to be applied to
commercial transactions and that the parties intended to bene-
fit from the provision for binding, unrevokable agreements to
arbitrate were businesses. The parties sponsoring the original
FAA were commercial businesses.' There was never any all-
encompassing intent of Congress to fashion a universal arbitra-
tion law applicable to private individuals or consumers. The
context of the FAA's background was one in which lawyers
who represented business interests sought to pass a law en-
abling their clients to enjoy the benefits of arbitration. When
referring to the beneficiaries of the Act, the American Bar
" See, e.g., United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) ("a complete ouster of jurisdiction ... is void
in a federal forum").
28Id.
2 See generally IAN MACNEIL ET AL., I FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 5.1 (1995).
0 IAN ,lACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW].
31 MAACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 30, at 113-15, 117.
2 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 38, 40.
' See, eg., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Southland deci-
sion is remarkable for its preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative
intent.
" See generally 1924 Hearings, supra note 26 (listing multiple firms sponsoring
bin).
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Association Committee that successfully shepherded the FAA
through Congress made specific reference not to "citizens" but,
instead, to "merchants.""5 Charles L. Bernheimer, Chair of the
Committee of Arbitration of the New York Chamber of Com-
merce, began his 1924 testimony in favor of the bill by refer-
ring to "the business point of view" that underlaid his analy-
sis.36 Bernheimer also made frequent mention of "merchants"
as those who would gain from the passage of the FAA." The
testimony of Julius Henry Cohen referred repeatedly to the
benefits of the Act to businesses, merchants, shippers, and
commerce." No mention of individual consumers who might
be covered by the Act exists in the legislative history of the
FAA.
The relationship of substantive legal principles to the
arbitration process was particularly unsettled at the passage of
the FAA. The supporters of the legislation borrowed from a
prior arbitration experience that permitted arbitrators to apply
equitable principles as a basis for decision. Yet, the Act itself
made specific reference to the "rights of the parties" as a basis
for setting aside an award.39 Use of the term "rights" within
the FAA is indicative of the unsettled nature of the original
American arbitration model. In the folklore arbitration model,
legal rights have no role whatsoever-arbitrators use whatever
norms they want when deciding disputes, and courts refuse to
review for errors of law. In the folklore type of arbitration, the
parties to an arbitration clause are opting out of the court
"' American Bar Ass'n Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law,
Legal Justification, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 156 (1925). Professor Macneil concludes that
this article, published shortly after the passage of the Act, "was lifted almost ver-
batim from Julius Henry Cohen's brief submitted to the joint subcommittee (in
1924]." MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, supra note 30, at 122.
"' 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 6-7. Bernheimer testified that he represent-
ed the Importers and Exporters Association, the Merchant's Association of New
York and 73 other businesses that endorsed the legislation leading to the passage
of the FAA. 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 6-7.
3' 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 7.
3' 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 38-41; accord, Lionel S. Popkin, Judicial
Construction of the New York Arbitration Law of 1920, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 329
(1926) ("Contracts between merchants or between others in the business world
are . . . those contracts primarily which the legislature in passing the Arbitration
Law wished to cover.").
"' 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1994) (permitting vacating of award where there is "any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced") (empha-
sis added).
[Vol. 62: 14591470
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system and seeking a "final" result from the arbitrator. If the
FAA truly did adopt a folklore model of arbitration, why did its
drafters provide explicit grounds for setting awards aside?
And, why did the FAA drafters choose to give the arbitral
parties "rights" that were to be of use in setting aside awards?
The logical, plain meaning answer may be that the type of
commercial arbitration envisioned by the Act's drafters was a
process that enabled the parties to retain some legal rights
that merited application by the arbitrator and the courts.
Whether these "rights" were to be procedural or substan-
tive is an interesting question. To date, courts have given scant
attention to the reference to "rights" in the FAA.4" The folk-
lore arbitration model, which posits that parties who consent
to arbitration give up all legal rights and effectively opt out of
the legal system, has no room whatsoever for legal rights. A
few courts and commentators explain away the "rights" refer-
ence in the FAA by employing a procedural twist. Some deci-
sions say that the arbitration must be fundamentally fair. '
This approach construes the arbitral parties' rights as relating
to a purely procedural, largely ambiguous and toothless "right"
to a fair hearing.
Such a reading of the FAA is inconsistent with the intent
of the drafters. Julius Henry Cohen was the chief spokesperson
supporting the passage of the FAA.42 Cohen explained the Act
in a 1926 article published shortly after the legislation's pas-
41 See generally MACNEIL ET AL., IV FEDERAL ARBiTRATION LAW, supra note 29,
§ 40.4.3 ("this catch-all provision [of § 10(a)3)] has in fact caught very little over
the years"). It is noteworthy that the thorough Macneil five-volume treatise cover-
ing federal arbitration law identifies no cases containing the 'rights' language of
§ 10(a)(3). See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 81, 115-17 (1992) (plain meaning of "rights" in § 1O(a)(3) of FAA implies
constitutional rights).
41 See, e.g., Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974)
(arbitrator must "grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing'r); Yates v. Yellow
Freight Sys., 501 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("[clourts will set aside
awards in which there is a procedural impropriety which denies a party funda-
mental fairness").
"' While it has sometimes been assumed that Cohen drafted the legislation, his
testimony supporting the bill praises the drafting and then asserts that 'it is not
my work." 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 15. W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, testified in favor of
the bill and stated that Cohen "has had charge of the actual drafting of the
work." 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 10. Cohen did admit that 'it is true I
made the first draft." 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 15.
1996]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
sage.43 He made specific reference to the arbitral parties'
holding of "rights."" He also referred to the court's task of
ensuring that the parties to an arbitration receive arbitral
rights.
45
To date, this important piece of legislative history has
been largely ignored by courts and underemphasized by com-
mentators. In addition to challenging the folklore that arbitral
parties have no rights, this important piece of history shows
that arbitration was not intended to be entirely informal. Even
in an informal setting the parties to an arbitration were in-
tended to possess formal rights.
The impact of this historical reading of the FAA also chal-
lenges another of the myths perpetrated by the folklore model
of arbitration, that of giving no judicial review in order to
achieve swift and final arbitration. It is very unlikely that
Julius Cohen foresaw that American judges would refuse to
provide any review whatsoever of arbitration awards. Cohen
testified that "it would be unjust to deny the right of appeal
altogether," that trial judges should "safeguard the party
whose rights have been substantially violated by the arbitra-
tors," and that "to deny any right of appeal at all would be to
take away a most important privilege and safeguard without a
compensating gain." 6 The numerous grounds for vacating
awards were carefully set out in the original legislation.47
Some of these grounds were ambiguous and would permit
courts to reinterpret the FAA in a more flexible manner consis-
tent with the original history and spirit of the Act.
' Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
" Cohen & Dayton, supra note 43, at 274 (referring to the arbitral participants
as having "rights," a "right of appeal" and "rights" to be "safeguard[ed]" during the
arbitration hearing).
" Cohen & Dayton, supra note 43, at 274 ("[1f arbitrators' awards are subject
to mistake and other human frailties, as necessarily they must be, it is obvious
that review solely by a judge setting a motion term will not suffice to safeguard
the party whose rights will have been substantially violated by the arbitrators.").
" 1924 Hearings, supra note 26, at 37; Cohen & Dayton, supra note 43, at
274.
'" United States Arbitration Act §§ 11-12 (recodified at 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994)).
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These points challenge the concept of "folklore arbitration"
that arbitration results are final. It appears that even the most
ardent of the supporters of the original FAA had a distinct role
in mind for the courts.
Whether courts should consider substantive law when
reviewing arbitral awards is a much more difficult question
than most commentators and courts presently are willing to
concede. Today we often hear the slogan that courts will not
review awards for mere errors of law." Yet, arbitration
awards in general, and securities arbitration in particular,
often involve detailed questions of statutory interpretation. It
is noteworthy that Julius Cohen was skeptical of using arbitra-
tion for the resolution of complicated statutory disputes:
[Arbitration] is not the proper method for deciding points of law of
major importance involving constitutional questions or policy in the
application of statutes. Speaking generally, it is a proper remedy for
the determination of those classes of disputes which arise day by
day in the common experience of the disputants and the individuals
to whom the dispute is to be referred.'
Cohen's unambiguous assertion should give pause to those who
wish to expand arbitration to all manner of disputes and to
divest the courts of any review function whatsoever.
Language within the Supreme Court landmark cases that
have expanded arbitration exhibit an understandable concern
that the limited review function of courts should include some
evaluation of whether an award is inconsistent with a statute.
Even McMahon, perhaps the high water mark of modern arbi-
tration, contained this intriguing rationale for arbitrability of
securities disputes:
[Tihe streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any conse-
quential restriction on substantive rights.... [Tihere is no reason to
assume at the outset that arbitrators wil not follow the law; [and]
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limit-
ed, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with
the requirements of the statute."
I' American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d
1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (courts must confirm arbitration awards despite "errone-
ous findings of fact or misinterpretation of law"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200
(1983).
" Cohen & Dayton, supra note 43, at 281.
50 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (emphasis added).
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The literal impact of this language would require a court to
assess whether a securities arbitrator has complied with the
various securities statutes applicable to the dispute.
Any instincts to ignore the above language seemingly en-
dorsing a model of judicialized arbitration should be put to rest
by the Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp. decision."
The Gilmer opinion, which required the arbitration of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claims, quoted the above
McMahon language favorably and used its judicial review
reference to ensure that arbitrators comply with the ADEA as
an explicit rationale.52
Nonetheless, lower courts have completely ignored these
passages from Gilmer and McMahon to require that courts
ensure that statutory rights are applied properly by arbitra-
tors. The myth of folklore arbitration has caused contemporary
courts to disregard the above referenced language of McMahon
and Gilmer. Most judges, like Judge Selya, assume that arbi-
tration means minimal or no judicial review and, despite the
admonitions of McMahon and Gilmer, avoid any requirement
that judges serve as guarantors of any particular statutory
rights.
The power of folklore arbitration model is considerable.
Folklore arbitration has survived a legislative history that fails
to support it. It has also caused modern judges to ignore the
Supreme Court's hint that judicial review of arbitration pre-
serves statutory rights, and to lose sight of the plain meaning
of the FAA and its reference to the "rights of the parties."
The relevance of the dubious folklore arbitration model to
securities arbitration reform is considerable. Reform of securi-
ties arbitration appears premised upon a feeling that the folk-
lore model is inappropriate for securities arbitration partici-
pants, and that, instead, a regulatory public interest model us-
ing features of judicialized arbitration should be implemented.
The rejection of folklore arbitration is entirely appropriate.
Folklore arbitration is largely a myth and is not supported by
"' 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
5 Id. at 32 n.4.
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an explicit legislative history or a carefully worded statute.
There is good reason for the Task Force and its supporters to
have abandoned the folklore arbitration model.
C. The Contract Model of Arbitration and Judicialization by
the Application of Law Clause
In the folklore model of arbitration, the arbitral signato-
ries contracted to a definite, firm process and tinkered mini-
mally apart from agreeing to arbitrate. Professor Speidel has
made a very important contribution to arbitration theory by
arguing that the courts and commentators have given too little
consideration to the legitimacy of investor consent to arbitra-
tion.' According to Professor Speidel, investor contracts to
arbitrate before the NASD amount to contracts of adhesion
that lack consent.'
Contract is central to the Speidel position and to arbitra-
tion theory. Without a valid agreement to arbitrate, arbitra-
tions can not and should not occur. Agreements that purport to
call for arbitration following a contractual process largely lack-
ing in consent are suspect. Arbitral organizations such as the
NASD, resting upon a shaky consensual process, are probably
wise to adopt judicial procedures. Such procedures are more
familiar to the typical "rookie" litigant investor who may bring
a securities claim against a broker. Judicialized arbitration
possesses a visceral sense of fairness that should help to
achieve a perception of equitable treatment that is essential to
investor confidence.
In contrast to alleged agreements to arbitrate contained in
boilerplate contracts between brokers and customers, the arbi-
tration clause used in balanced transactions between equally
sophisticated parties is often much different. Much of the de-
mand for juicialized arbitration comes from the parties them-
selves. Corporate America spends billions of dollars each year
to get quality "preventative law" legal advice. Well-run busi-
nesses seek to follow the law in order to decrease the risk of
Speidel, supra note 10, passim.
Speidel, supra note 10, at 1337 ("securities arbitration is located on the dark
side of the arbitration coin, since the contract to arbitrate is essentially a contract
of adhesion').
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liability losses. Not surprisingly, some businesses may desire
to use arbitration to achieve a quicker and private result but
fear the type of lawless juror-like outcomes that will often
characterize inscrutable arbitration awards. These firms have
long opted to write an arbitral contract with an application of
law clause-a clause requiring the arbitrator to apply substan-
tive legal principles in deciding the dispute.
Judge Selya acknowledges this development but criticizes
court enforcement of such rational bargains as mistaken efforts
to judicialize arbitration.55 Increasing use of the application of
law clause, however, is entirely understandable. Businesses
want to avoid risk and to achieve predictability in their
transactions. The application of law clause provides a means to
take advantage of some of the features of arbitration and to
avoid the potential arbitrariness that characterizes the folklore
model of arbitration.
Businesses that opt for the application of law clause are, of
course, opting to spend more on their arbitral process. Courts
should enforce such clauses by agreeing to review the awards
to effectuate the will of the parties. Indeed, some firms choose
to draft their arbitration clauses to provide specifically that
"the courts will review the award for legal error."56 This type
of clause achieves the same result as the application of law
clause. Under the contract model of arbitration, the courts
must enforce arbitral bargains.
Existing decisions demonstrate that courts will provide
review of arbitrations where the parties so provide. Gateway
Technologies v. MCI Telecommunications" illustrates the
power of the application of law clause. There the court of ap-
peals followed the parties' instruction to review for "errors of
law," and vacated a $2,000,000 punitive damage award. The
arbitration clause provided that the parties would "negotiate in
good faith any disputes" and that, if negotiations failed to
resolve differences, binding arbitration was to occur "except
that errors of law shall be subject to appeal.""8 The arbitra-
Selya, supra note 5, at 1455.
See, e.g., Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications, Inc., 64
F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Fil et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
6 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
58 Id. at 995
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tion clause was part of a commercial contract calling for Gate-
way to furnish, install and maintain the technology and equip-
ment needed for inmates at Virginia corrections institutions to
make automated collect telephone calls. The trial court rejected
MCrs effort to set aside the award, reasoning that its review
would not require "a scrutiny as strict as would be applied by
an appellate court reviewing the actions of a trial court."
Instead, the district judge reviewed "under the harmless error
standard, but with due regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration."'0
The Gateway Technologies decision is predicated upon the
contract model of arbitration. While the nature of judicial re-
view on suits to vacate arbitral awards is normally very nar-
row,6' the Fifth Circuit viewed this particular arbitration
clause as expanding judicial review. The opinion went out of
its way to acknowledge the position of the trial judge, who was
clearly in favor of settling what he thought was an ill-fated
effort by the parties to unnecessarily judicialize arbitration.'
The trial judge accused the parties of having "sacrificed the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration on the
altar of appellate review." Citing and quoting Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University,6" Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.," and First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,' the Fifth
59 Id. at 996.
6Id.
61 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995)
(courts to set aside arbitral awards "only in very unusual circumstances"); Dole
Ocean Liner Express v. Georgia Vegetable Co., 84 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Our review of the arbitration award itself is very deferential, and we should set
aside that decision only in narrow circumstances.); Antwine v. Prudential Bache
Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990) ("review of an arbitration award is
extraordinarily narrow").
6 Gateway Technologies v. MCI Telecommunications, 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th
Cir. 1995).
' Id. at 996 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)) (Supreme Court articulates a
contract driven model of arbitration because to ignore parties' contract "would be
quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate
are enforced according to their terms") (emphasis added).
"Id (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson, Lehman & Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212, 1216 (1995), quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (Supreme Court stresses contract
model of arbitration by suggesting that "arbitration under the [FAA] ... is a
matter of consent, not coercion, and the parties are generally free to structure
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Circuit placed itself clearly in the camp of those who view arbi-
tration as a model of contract or party choices and rejected the
trial court's effort to adhere to arbitration as a static, folklore
paradigm.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
validity of honoring the parties' intent in their agreement to
arbitrate. Volt represents an unequivocal endorsement of the
contract model of arbitration. In Volt, the Court construed the
FAA to "ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are en-
forced according to their terms."6 The Volt decision permitted
the parties' insertion of an expansive choice of law clause to
include implied reference to California arbitration law that
permitted a stay of arbitration pending the conclusion of litiga-
tion. Two 1995 Supreme Court cases echoed Volt's penchant for
private ordering. In Mastrobuono, the Court upheld an
arbitrator's award of punitive damages by relying on party
intent. Mastrobuono pointed to the arbitration clause's refer-
ence to the use of NASD procedures and the ability of the
arbitrator to award punitive damages, which was clearly set
forth in the NASD Arbitrator's Manual. Mastrobuono firmly
followed Volt by reasoning that "the parties are generally free
to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."
67
First Options of Chicago supported this reasoning. By stating
that "the basic objective in this [arbitration] area [is] ... to
ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other
contracts, 'are enforced according to their terms,"'68 the deci-
sion clearly stands on the contract model foundation.
Several other federal decisions take the position that a
court should honor the desires of the parties to judicialize
arbitration. For example, in Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jefferies & Co., Inc.," the Ninth Circuit overturned a trial
court's petition to vacate a NASD arbitral award in which the
their arbitration agreements as they see fit")).
' Id. at 996-97 (quoting First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920,
1925 (1995) ("the basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the
quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' wishes, but to ensure that
commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to
their terms")).
66 Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
67 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
'" First Options of Chicago, 115 S. Ct. at 1925.
" 958 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992).
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panel ignored the parties' agreement that they enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The investor, an insurance com-
pany, authorized its broker to invest up to $20 million. At the
investor's request, the broker agreed to alter the standard form
arbitration agreement to require the arbitrators to supplement
the award with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
award failed to include findings and conclusions. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit based its decision on the panel's
failure to arbitrate consistent with the conditions set by the
arbitral parties,7" and concluded that the panel's refusal to
follow the parties' instructions amounted to action exceeding
the panel's authority under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA."
Western Employers is of particular interest because it involved
a party selection of a judicialized form of arbitration in a secu-
rities arbitration setting. It stands as authority for the proposi-
tion that knowledgeable parties to a securities arbitration may
desire trial-like procedures and illustrates that a brokerage
firm will contract for judicialized arbitration when faced with
demand from an important customer.
Similarly in Fils et Cables d'Acier Lens v. Midland Metals
Corp.,72 the trial court upheld the parties' desires that the
arbitrator "shall make findings of fact and shall render an
award based thereon," and that the trial court, when determin-
ing whether to confirm the award, "shall have the power to re-
view (1) whether the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator
are ... supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether as
70 Id. at 262 ("the NASD panel clearly failed to arbitrate the dispute according
to the terms of the arbitration agreement").
71 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994). The Western Employers court was not completely
impressed with the ability of the parties to contract freely for judicialized arbitra-
tion. In dictum, Judge Nelson observed that the use of findings of fact and con-
clusions of law would not change the nature of court review of arbitral awards.
958 F.2d at 261. Citing Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817
F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1987), the Western Employers decision reasoned that it would
not alter the otherwise deferential standard of review of awards even where find-
ings reveal that the arbitrator had misapplied the law. Western Employers, 958
F.2d at 261. This reasoning is hardly startling. Findings of fact and conclusions of
law are routine in labor grievance arbitration. Systematic and enhanced judicial
review of such findings has long been rejected. See, eg., American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) ("award
will not be vacated because of erroneous findings of fact or misinterpretations of
law").
72 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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a matter of law... the award should be affirmed, modified or
vacated.""3 Fils analyzed the issue as one controlled by con-
tract principles-the court viewed the arbitration as "wholly
dependent upon agreement."7 4 The Fils decision also reasoned
that the arbitral parties possessed the contractual power to
bind the court "absent a jurisdictional or public policy barri-
er.""5 The court found no violation of public policy because the
task of reviewing the arbitrator's findings is "clearly a far less
searching and time-consuming inquiry than a full trial."76 Fils
also supports the contract model of arbitration in a noteworthy
factual context. The parties were two businesses involved in a
multinational business transaction who entered into an in-
formed, arm's length agreement to use a type of judicialized
arbitration.
Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan77 also sup-
ports the parties' agreement to judicialize arbitration by con-
tracting for a greater scope of judicial review. In Collins, the
arbitrator upheld the plaintiffs claim that she had been termi-
nated from her non-union job, a violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act78 and the Michigan Handicappers' Civil
Rights Act79 and ordered reinstatement and back pay. The
issue of the scope of review arose when the employer, Blue
Cross, sought to have the award set aside. Although the dis-
trict judge upheld the award, he did so by reviewing for error
of law. The parties had agreed that the arbitrator's decision
could be reviewed "on the ground that the arbitrator commit-
ted an error of law."" Citing Volt as creating "freedom of con-
tract,""1 the court applied the error of law standard of review
despite noting that the plaintiff, a non-union employee, "did
not bargain for this lowered standard." 2
73 Id. at 242.
74 Id. at 244.
75 Id.
76 Id.
71 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 96 F.3d
1448 (6th Cir. 1996).
78 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,101 (1995).
79 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.550(101) (Callaghan 1996).
" Collins, 916 F. Supp. at 640.
' Id. at 641.
2 Id. at 642. This reference to a "lowered" standard of review appears errone-
ous. In Collins the contract called for a heightened, not lowered, scope of judicial
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Not every decision is hospitable to the parties' desires to
judicialize arbitration. In Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp.," the district court refused to follow the arbitral parties'
agreement that the court "shall vacate, modify or convert any
award... where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence or... where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous."' The arbitration was be-
fore a panel of the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chambers of Commerce and involved American
and Japanese companies. The court reasoned that arbitral par-
ties cannot change the provisions for review set forth in the
FAA, and that a public policy in favor of quick and informal
arbitration prevented the court from following the parties'
intent to seek greater review. The Lapine Technology decision
appears to ignore the Supreme Court cases that require courts
to uphold the intent of the arbitral parties. Yet, the result in
Lapine Technology is not surprising. The decision involved a
prior ICC arbitration that had taken four years to run its
course and contained a record with "hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of exhibits."' Under these circumstances the court
would be required to take considerable time to provide clearly
erroneous review.
Similarly, in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi-
cago Sun-Times,"6 Judge Richard Posner refused to give en-
hanced judicial review to a written opinion accompanying a la-
bor arbitration award. Judge Posner's reasoning focused on
federal jurisdiction, a subject that he viewed as beyond the
parties' powers to create by contract. In his terms, the arbitral
parties "cannot contract for judicial review of that [arbitrall
award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract."""
Such reasoning appears specious. While it is undoubtedly true
that the FAA does not itself create federal subject matter juris-
diction," the Chicago Typographical Union decision seems
review.
909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Id at 702.
Id at 706.
935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1505 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 970
(9th Cir. 1981) (independent subject matter jurisdiction needed for federal court to
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predicated upon federal subject matter jurisdiction, which was
clearly present in a case based upon a federal question. Judge
Posner also based his refusal to provide more than the custom-
ary deferential review standard upon a second point. He as-
serted that "[iut would be a serious practical mistake... to
subject the reasoning in arbitrators' opinions to beady-eyed
scrutiny [because] it might discourage them from writing opin-
ions at all."89 Judge Posner reasoned that the process of writ-
ing arbitral opinions is desirable "because writing disciplines
thought" and review of such opinions would create disincen-
tives to their production."° This analysis is supportive of arbi-
tral judicialization at least in the sense that Judge Posner
appears to support arbitration opinion writing. It is only en-
hanced judicial review that Judge Posner opposes in the Chi-
cago Typographical Union.
II. SECURITIES ARBITRATION IS SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENTIATED
FROM LITIGATION
At present, NASD arbitration is sufficiently different than
litigation. There are numerous important distinctions that
merit attention and continue to cause the securities industry to
opt for arbitration over trial. Consequently, Judge Selya's fear
that judicialized securities arbitration and litigation have be-
come mirror images is misplaced.
First and foremost, securities arbitrations lack a civil jury.
In my opinion, this characteristic is the raison d'etre of securi-
ties arbitration and probably the real historical reason for its
very existence; the securities industry developed NASD arbi-
tration primarily to avoid adverse civil jury trial results. Ju-
rors are likely to favor individual investors and be hostile to
the securities industry. Securities arbitration permits the in-
dustry to avoid these prejudices and, as important, avoid the
risk of potentially large punitive damage awards. While puni-
tive damages are possible in securities arbitration, they are
hear case brought under FAA to confirm arbitral award).
Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1506.
90 Id.
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awarded'in less than one percent of all completed arbitra-
tions."s The risk of punitive damages is far greater in the civil
jury trial.92
Second, discovery is fully available and routinized in civil
litigation but is, of course, deemphasized in securities arbitra-
tion.s At present, depositions occur rarely in securities arbi-
tration. While document exchanges are increasingly the norm
in arbitration, they occur (or fail to occur) without the judicial
supervision and threat of sanction that occurs in civil litiga-
tion. In other words, there is much less discovery available in
securities arbitration. The limited amount of discovery that
occurs often misfires due to the lack of an authority figure
needed to administer the discovery process.
Third, securities arbitration occurs privately, far from the
public eye. The industry strongly favors this characteristic
because public allegations of broker misconduct tend to depress
investor confidence. To be sure, some general publicity regard-
ing securities arbitration is available to the public. Journalists
are able to learn of and report major securities arbitration
results.' The narrow amount of SEC oversight of the
91 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
See IARK A. PETERSON ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 8-9 (1987) (study of incidence of punitive damages
finds that punitives were awarded in 2.5% of Cook County trials and 8.37 of San
Francisco County verdicts between 1980 and 1984); William M. Landes & Richard
A- Posner, New Light on Punitiue Damages, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33, 35 (study
of federal product liability trials from 1982 to 1984 identifies 10 punitive damages
awards out of 172 trials).
9' See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 77-78 (describing discovery proce-
dure in securities arbitration as one in which orders from the arbitrator are es-
sential to obtain depositions under 'fairly narrow circumstance"); SICA,
ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 10 (1992) (referring to the existence of a "traditional reser-
vation about the overuse of depositions in arbitration"); C. Edward Fletcher, Pri-
vatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71
INN. L. REV. 393, 453 (1987) ("discovery is available in arbitration proceedings; it
is just more limited than in full-blown litigation"); Seligman, supra note 3, at 352
(describing status of discovery in securities arbitration to be one in which
"[diepositions for discovery purposes are discouraged and are recommended only to
preserve testimony").
The Wall Street Journal appears to regularly publicize important develop-
ments in arbitration. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 3; largaret A. Jacobs, Riding
Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt with a Sex Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June
9, 1994, at Al; Deborah Lohse, NASD Rule for Damages Is Criticized, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 3, 1997, at C1.
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NASD95 guarantees that major developments in securities
arbitration receive some public airing. Nonetheless, the indi-
vidual securities arbitrations remain essentially private affairs
with little public awareness. Unlike conventional trials, securi-
ties arbitrations are essentially private.
Fourth, an NASD arbitration ends silently without written
opinions or findings. The NASD now requires awards to state
the issues covered.9" Yet, this change is marginal. Awards
remain inscrutable documents that give the losing party no
idea whatsoever of the basis for decision. A statement summa-
rizing the issues in an arbitration is a far cry from a statement
of reasons. The arbitration loser wonders why the loss occurred
and whether the arbitrators really understood the issues pre-
sented.
Fifth, securities arbitration remains lawless. The arbitra-
tor need not apply substantive legal principles. The old "mani-
fest disregard? of the law97 standard appears close to dead.9"
We now hear the repeated refusals of appellate courts to re-
view for "mere error of law."99 While securities arbitration
surely operates in the "shadow of the law," it is clear that the
arbitrators need not apply law. This is a characteristic that
may operate to the detriment of the securities industry. In my
experience, arbitrators may well want to "give the investor
something for his trouble" even when a substantive legal fail-
ure of the claimant to prove a prima facie case has occurred.
" See supra text accompanying notes 11-18.
96 NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 41(e) (1995) (award shall contain
"a summary of the issues").
9 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
'" See, e.g., Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court:
Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Stan.
dard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241 (1993) (noting that no appellate court has ever used
manifest disregard to uphold the vacating of an award); Chameleon Dental Prods.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1991) (court of appeals refuses to
apply manifest disregard standard and asserts "we have consistently held that the
exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying a commercial arbitration award are
found in § 10 and § 11 of the Arbitration Act").
" See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682
F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992)
(court will not set aside award merely because of erroneous application of law or
erroneous fact-finding).
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Sixth, despite the criticism of alleged "collateral litiga-
tion,""°° the results of arbitration in general and securities
arbitration in particular remain close to final. Awards are
almost impossible to set aside. Courts have clearly drawn the
line in refusing to set aside awards. Professor Speidel is correct
in asserting that "finality is a core ingredient of arbitra-
tion."'01 Finality is and must be a contrasting characteristic
of arbitration as compared to litigation. Yet, it is fair to say
that arbitral awards are just as final today as they were ten
and even twenty years ago.
To summarize, securities arbitration is grossly different
than litigation. The Hotelling Principle, which posits that com-
petitive firms will tend to offer very similar products,"e has
no real applicability to the present state of competition that ex-
ists between conventional litigation and securities arbitration.
Judge Selya is correct in identifying that the Task Force Re-
port and NASD have urged adopting features that have long
been characteristics of litigation. Yet, these changes exist only
at the margin of securities arbitration and do not change the
core of a process that, while laden with some features of litiga-
tion, is still largely an arbitral process. If securities arbitration
had collapsed into a form of litigation, the industry would not
continue to use arbitration and the Arbitration Department of
the NASD would have already been disbanded. No such event
has occurred.
" "Collateral litigation" refers to litigation related to the subject of a dispute
being arbitrated. Collateral litigation is criticized by the Task Force. See TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23-25 (describing practice of NASD member firms
seeking court relief based on eligibility rule or limitations after case submitted to
arbitration but before award).
... Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 151, 191 (1987).
The theory underlying arbitral finality is that the disputants prefer a final deci-
sion rather that an appellate courts second guess. See Wharton Poor, Arbitration
Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 676 (1927).
" See Selya, supra note 5, at 1450.
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III. JUDICIALIZATION OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION ADVANCES
IMPORTANT POLICIES
A. Arbitration Discovery Enhances Arbitration Results
Truth is the major goal in any system of adjudication,"'
including arbitration. If securities arbitration cannot reach
outcomes that are accurate, justice is frustrated and investor
confidence, a necessary factor in any successful market, is
reduced.
The availability of discovery is essential to reaching accu-
rate results in any dispute resolution context. Disputants need
information to sort out the strengths and weaknesses of their
own claims and those of their adversary. Arbitrators also need
discovery. Without the sufficient evidence that flows from dis-
covery, arbitrators are unable to achieve accurate results.
Economists posit perfect information in order for decision mak-
ers to achieve efficiency. While perfect information exists in a
heuristic assumption, a degree of partially complete informa-
tion that stems from some discovery is the real world equiva-
lent. Economic theory supports some discovery in arbitration,
at least enough discovery up to the point where the costs of
discovery exceed the benefits. Complex disputes simply need
information to reach acceptable results.
This positive view of arbitration discovery is shared by
Professor Joel Seligman. He has asserted that "discovery is the
key to securities arbitration"0 4 and reasons that effective dis-
covery increases the probability of settling investor claims
against brokers. Put differently, an arbitration system that
bars discovery would force most claims to hearing because the
disputants would be unable to compare the merits of their own
103 See RONALD DWoRKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 72-74 (1905) (accurate re-
sults are an important feature of dispute resolution); Geoffrey Hazard, Rising
Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 167-71 (1986) (pursuit of a "right out-
come" in litigation is a characteristic of legitimacy); Robert Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 1-3 (1974) (accurate results constitute a litigation value representing "good re-
sult efficacy").
10 Seligman, supra note 3, at 355.
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case to that of their opponent. Precluding any discovery would
result in unnecessary arbitral hearings and cause those cases
that do go to hearing to reach inaccurate results.
At present, a modest amount of discovery is available in
securities arbitration.1"5 Document requests are routine.
While depositions are, in practice, uncommon, they remain
possible and are entirely within the discretion of the arbitra-
tion panel.0 6 The Task Force Report sets forth a sort of stan-
dardization of arbitration discovery by calling for automatic
disclosure of "essential documents."'" Under this proposal,
the parties would identify and voluntarily turn over to their
adversary the documents that are routinely requested in inves-
tor claims against brokers.' The Task Force Report makes
an additional discovery proposal that further judicializes dis-
covery. By calling for earlier selection of panel chairs,' the
Task Force has recognized that unmanaged discovery breeds
problems-adversary attorneys will bicker about discovery if
unsupervised. The panel chair's ability to use a firm hand in
managing any discovery squabbles should go far to remove the
complaints that securities arbitration discovery has become an
overly contentious mirror image of the problems that have
burdened conventional litigation. It is a small wonder that the
narrow quantum of document discovery that has characterized
securities arbitration has worked at all without anyone in
effective charge of the process that inevitably produces a mea-
sure of conflict. There is reason to be critical of the existing
chaotic and unsupervised discovery process in securities arbi-
tration. More, not less, discovery is needed, and the Task Force
discovery proposals, while useful, could have gone even farther
to routinize arbitration discovery that is shown to be essential
to a party.
105 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4; Fletcher, supra note 93; Seligman,
supra note 3;
" See, e.g., SICA, supra note 93, at 10 ("[Tlhe effective use of discovery tools
such as depositions rests in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators.).
107 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 62. The disclosure should occur within
45 days of the filing of the respondents answer. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
4, at 62.
,1 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82-83.
"09 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 86.
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B. Written Arbitration Opinions Improve the Quality of the
Arbitration Process
As the Gateway Technologiesn1 decision shows, it is in-
creasingly common for predispute arbitration clauses between
sophisticated parties of equal bargaining power to require the
arbitrators to include findings of fact, conclusions of law and
reasons in their awards. Such written opinions advance the
legitimacy of the arbitral process. An all too typical award that
omits reasons and reveals only a one sentence result is com-
pletely inscrutable; it is insulting, puzzling and insensitive to
the losing party. Every arbitration loser would like to know
why he or she has lost. Even the arbitration winner is curious
to learn what proof or strategy caused the result.
A short written opinion with reasons will also foster public
confidence in securities arbitration. The present inscrutable
but available award smacks of an industry desire for secrecy.
The present situation implies that the industry has something
to hide. A publicly available, brief award with reasons will ad-
vance the public opinion of the process substantially."'
Written arbitration opinions are helpful to clients. The
compliance officer of a securities firm that has lost an arbitra-
tion should be aware of the practices that led to an adverse
result. Without such information liability risks continue to
exist.
Written opinions also aid the decisionmaking process and
thereby help the arbitrators. The need for a written decision
should sharpen the process of decision and avoid any possibili-
ty of a rushed or "compromise" award.
A short written opinion stating reasons for a securities
arbitration award would provide a more efficient means of the
narrow judicial review that exists under the FAA."' While
the FAA places severe limits on a party seeking to set aside an
award and does not provide a general appeal, various grounds
110 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
... The enhanced public confidence in securities arbitration that would accompa-
ny adoption of a short written opinion with reasons constitutes a positive
externality. A third party, the investor public, will benefit from this change.
" For discussion of the ambiguity in the legislative history of the FAA sur-
rounding judicial review of arbitral awards, see supra text accompanying notes 39-
46.
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for setting aside awards exist." If these grounds are to be
taken seriously, as they must, some means of communication
between the arbitrators and the judge who must try to
deconstruct a particular arbitral experience are essential. A
brief written award with reasons should greatly enhance the
court's ability to assess the propriety of an effort to set aside
an award. The availability of reasons will not make it any
easier to set aside awards; the grounds remain narrow and are
not changed by a procedure that merely calls for explana-
tion."4
Written awards will also help create a valuable corpus
juris of decisions. While not binding on subsequent arbitration,
these publicly available decisions may prove helpful to subse-
quent arbitrators who may need guidance to reach the correct
decisions."' They would also be of value to a brokerage house
interested in restructuring past practices which have led to ex-
cessive liability. Future investors of means might also have the
incentive to research whether particular firms employ undesir-
able business practices or, conversely, whether a particular
firm chosen as a broker enjoys a generally positive record in
customer claims against brokers.
Required written opinions should also help the common
law growth and evaluation of securities laws. McMahon and its
progeny have effectively removed a large number of disputes
from our courts. Without written and publicly available exposi-
tory opinions, securities regulation has the danger of not evolv-
ing and remaining unresponsive to new development and
trends."6 An evolving common law with publicly available
113 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) to (5) (1994).
11 See Katzler, supra note 3, at 185 (=requiring written opinions . . . would not
create new avenues for appeal").
1I See Lipton, Generating Precedent, supra note 3 (present system is incapable
of generating helpful precedent); Lipton, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 3, at
888 (availability of written opinions will aid decisionmnaking process of arbitrators).
The written opinions would not be binding on a particular arbitration; arbitration
would remain a fact based adjudication focusing on the individual proof proffered.
See SICA, supra note 93, at 19 ("arbitrators are not strictly bound by case prece-
dent or statutory law").
16 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternatiue Dispute Resolu-
tion, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1987) (stressing that written opinions help law
evolve and grow and thereby make law more effective); Katzler, supra note 3, at
177 (emphasizing that lack of written opinions causes securities laws to remain
static).
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decisions is generally efficient because it can respond to the
information presented to a decisionmaker and, corresponding-
ly, is constantly able to adjust to change."' Written decisions
help to "shrink uncertainty and clarify opinions by stimulating
fuller elaboration of rights and duties."' Without the ability
to respond regularly to changes, periodic expensive and far
reaching law reform efforts are a less efficient means to guar-
antee accurate and up-to-date laws.
The Task Force Report takes a halfway position on written
awards. The Task Force would mandate written opinions on
awards dealing with statute of limitations issues"9 and re-
quire an award granting punitive damages to explain what
portion of the award is compensatory or punitive.121 If puni-
tive damages are assessed, the losing party may require the
arbitrators to prepare a written explanation of "conduct [giv-
ing] rise to the award."'
These Task Force proposals constitute a half-step in the
right direction. The overall lack of consent that characterizes
the alleged investor agreement to arbitrate means that one
party to a securities arbitration lack much, if any, appreciation
of the subtleties of the arbitral process. The investor who loses
an arbitration is unlikely to accept an award without reasons.
Reasons are the essence of a fair, efficient system of justice
and should be made routine in securities arbitration.
C. Required Application of Substantive Law Would Improve
Securities Arbitration
The Task Force recommended a significant use of manda-
tory substantive law application when it required the arbitra-
tors to apply the statute of limitations principles when dealing
117 See Lipton, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 3, at 888 (present system that
lacks written awards is "incapable of advancing the law regarding customer/broker
relations when such advancements are warranted").
1" Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1011, 1025 (1986); see George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection
of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (common law has built in advantage
of adjusting to change).
"9 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
120 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 44.
121 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 44. This, however, is not the same
thing as requiring a legal basis for the award.
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with allegations that investor claims are time-barred.' The
Task Force tied this use of legal rules to a written opinion by
requiring the panel to issue a written statement with reasons
for a decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on limita-
tions grounds and mandating a "reference to the law on which
the arbitrators relied on reaching a determination."'
This recommendation advances important policies. Appli-
cation of firm rules dealing with the statute of limitations
should promote a clearer understanding of the likely outcome
prior to the time an investor claim is filed. Accordingly, rigid
law application increases the information available regarding
the probability of success and enhances the chance of settle-
ment. Settlement is a major goal in arbitration, just as it is in
conventional trial.
It is particularly interesting to highlight an intriguing
footnote in the Task Force recommendation that the arbitra-
tors be directed to decide limitations issues based on substan-
tive law:
[AlIthough we recognize that arbitration generally is considered to
be an equitable forum, we believe that arbitrators should consider
applicable statutory and common law with respect to all matters as
to which they must make decisions in the arbitration forum, not just
statute of limitations issues."M
This note flirts with but fails to require the securities arbitra-
tor to apply legal principles to decide matters presented. The
note should have gone all the way to universally mandate a
legal result in all situations. A segment of the Task Force
probably supported such an extension because the note's lan-
guage smacks of compromise with the flexible "should consider
applicable" law rather than a more rigid "must apply applica-
ble" legal norms.
The relationship of the application of law to securities
arbitration's lack of meaningful investor consent justifies a
more rigid position than that taken by the Task Force. Where
two textile merchants agree to arbitrate in a setting in which
they select a third merchant as the arbitrator-a situation not
unlike that envisioned by the drafters of the FAA-the parties
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-32.
123 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
,21 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 n.51.
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understand and expect an equitable result not bounded by
substantive law. In contrast, the typical investor who signs a
new account standard form contract with a brokerage house
has little understanding of the meaning of the executed agree-
ment to arbitrate. Lack of real consent to arbitrate is and re-
mains the most serious problem underlying securities arbitra-
tion. To the degree that the investor has any expectation of
possible future dispute resolution procedure, the reasonable
investor would probably anticipate that the protections of legal
principles would apply. A norm that requires the application of
substantive rules would be consistent with rational investor
expectations and, in a general sense, uphold the policy of meet-
ing the intent of the parties.
CONCLUSION
The judicialization of securities arbitration is well under-
way and, with the proposals of the 1996 Task Force Report, is
gaining momentum. These changes are salutary and represent
real improvement in the quality of securities arbitration.
The steps toward judicialization help create a more accu-
rate and fair dispute resolution framework. Early appointment
of panel chairs should yield a more efficient and symmetrical
sharing of pre-trial information, which, in turn, should in-
crease pre-hearing settlements by allowing the parties and
their counsel a more informed vision of the dispute. Applica-
tion of substantive limitations law should dispose of some
cases by providing greater predictability of result, and is con-
sistent with the intent of the substantive claims brought in
arbitration. The availability of a written opinion in the small
percentage of cases in which punitive damages are awarded
seems only fair and advances legitimacy by giving the parties
reasons for the award. An inscrutable award may help keep
awards final, but it is a trouble spot in securities arbitration.
The Task Force should have gone further and required a brief
statement of reasons to accompany all securities arbitration
awards.
In a general sense, we live in the day and age of the con-
tract model of arbitration in which the parties bargain for
particular arbitral procedures. The "folklore" model of arbitra-
tion is collapsing because many -informed parties do not want
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the jury-like risk of arbitrariness that can accompany grossly
simplified arbitration. Instead, parties who are knowledgeable
about arbitration can select the degree of informality desired.
While judicialized features cost more, it appears that there is a
real demand (and commensurate supply) for a more expensive
type of arbitration. You get what you pay for in most ventures,
including arbitration.
The lack of informed consent prevents the contract model
from working its way into securities arbitration in the same
way that contract bargaining is now working its way into the
standard arbitration clause between two informed parties of
relatively equal bargaining power. In securities arbitration
there is no real consent to arbitrate and, on the part of the typ-
ical investor, no understanding of the nature of the arbitral
process. Accordingly, the SRO must be a surrogate for the
investor and, in a sort of public interest model of arbitration,
create an arbitration that the rational investor would desire.
In that regard, the direction of the Task Force toward adoption
of judicialized features is consistent with the probable needs
and intent of the rational investor.
Securities arbitration would be improved substantially by
adoption of the Task Force proposals. Indeed, securities arbi-
tration would improve even more greatly if steps toward
judicialization beyond that of the Task Force recommendations
were adopted. The rational investor would welcome (1) full
application of legal principles, (2) an occasional deposition
needed to flesh out the probable outcome of a potentially un-
necessary hearing, and (3) a short written statement of reasons
accompanying an award. Such procedures are already being
adopted in arm's length negotiation of arbitration clauses be-
tween informed businesses. These safeguards are equally need-
ed to improve securities arbitration and should be given seri-
ous consideration by the self-regulatory representatives of the
public interest, the SROs.
Despite Judge Selya's protestations, there is little likeli-
hood that securities arbitration will blend into litigation. Secu-
rities arbitrations still take place in private, far from public
scrutiny. No jury is present to potentially increase awards
greatly. Minimal discovery exists, and legal rights are only
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rarely articulated and explicitly applied. In short, the Task
Force changes, while important, do not transform securities
arbitration into litigation.
